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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
ADoPoION--JumciAL
TION Co1

PROCEEDING-WHET:ER COURT ABUSES DrscRE-

lERR ON IT BY STATUTE IN DENYING PETITION FOR ADOPTION

BECAUSE OF CONFLICT IN RELIGIOUS BELimFs--The Appellate Court for the

Second District gave meaning to a section of the Illinois Adoption Act'

which had never heretofore been interpreted which decided the recent case
of Cooper v. Hinrichs.2 The case came up on appeal by petitioners from
an adverse judgment in an adoption proceeding wherein the petitioners
who were members of one religious faith, had sought to adopt certain
children earlier baptized in a different faith, over the protest of the natural
mother of such children.3 After intervention by a religious organization
of the same faith as that of the mother had been permitted,4 the trial
court received evidence as to the religious differences and to the point
that there were numerous families of the same faith as that of the children
who would be eligible to adopt the children and, on the basis thereof, it
then denied the petition. The Appellate Court affirmed this holding when
it concluded that the lower court had not abused the discretion vested in
it by the aforementioned statutory provision.
There has always been a tendency on the part of the courts of this
state to favor the child in matters concerning the construction of the
adoption statute, with the child's welfare being treated as the issue of

paramount importance. 5 The legislature has also generally been in accord
with that view, witness the statutory provision in question. 6 But issue
of the kind at hand ought not be dealt with summarily for it may not
be to the child's benefit to have adoption delayed until a suitable applicant
of the same religious belief appears,7 hence the wisdom of leaving the
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1 Ch. 4, § 4-2.
2 8 Ill. App. (2d) 144, 130 N. E. (2d) 678 (1955). Dove, P. J. wrote a specially
concurring opinion.
3 The children had previously been declared dependent and placed under the
guardianship of a public official.
4 An objection based on the ground such organization had no proper basis on
which to intervene was overruled on the basis it was better to allow strangers who
claimed an interest to participate in the case. The entire question could have been
avoided had the intervening party sought permission to act as amiotus8 curiase.
5 People ex rel. Nabstedt v. Barger, 3 Ill (2d) 511, 121 N. E. (2d) 781 (1954),
noted in 33 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 249; McConnell v. McConnell, 345 Ill.
70, 141 N. E. 178 (1931) ; Hopkins v. Gifford, 309 Ill. 363, 141 N. E. 178 (1923).
6 The particular provision was first added to the Adoption Act in 1945. For a
discussion of a statute of similar import see the Massachusetts cases of Petition
of Galley, 329 Mass. 143, 107 N. E. (2d) 21 (1952); and Petitions of Goldman,
331 'Mass. 647, 121 N. E. (2d) 843 (1954).
7 See "Religious Factors in Adoption," 28 Ind. I4 J. (Spring 1953), where at
page 402, the author points out that "institutional living is a poor substitute for
the warmth and affection of home and family."
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question to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be
exercised in the light of the particular circumstances found in each case.8
On this basis, the instant holding cannot be subjected to criticism
other than to note that it could hardly serve as a precedent for the
determination of still other cases, so the particular application to be
given to the statute remains to be worked out in piece-meal fashion to the
vicissitude of circumstances as developed in other situations.9
CARRIERS-CARRAGE

OWES A TRANUSR

OF PAS&9ENERS--W=EMES

OR NOT A CARR

ING PASSENGER THE HiHEST DEGREE OF CARF-An

interesting question involving the duty of a common carrier toward a
transferring passenger was presented to the Illinois Supreme Court in the
recent case of Rotheli v. Chicago Transit Authority.' Therein, the plaintiff,
a passenger of defendant, had alighted from a trolley bus for the purpose
of transferring to another for the completion of his journey. After the
plaintiff had fully alighted, the bus started forward and in some manner
struck the plaintiff. The trial court instructed the jury that if they found
that the plaintiff had fully alighted, then the relationship of passenger
and carrier had ceased and thereafter the duty owed the plaintiff by the
defendant was that of ordinary care. Following an adverse verdict and
judgment, the plaintiff sought review in the Appellate Court for the First
District, and that court affirmed the judgment. On the basis of a certificate
of importance,2 the matter was taken to the Illinois Supreme Court where
the challenged instruction was again upheld.
The court, in reaching its conclusion, overruled Feldman v. Chicago
Railways Company,8 a case identical on its facts, and followed the4
reasoning first noted in Dean v. South Side Elevated Railroad Company.
Carriers of passengers have been held to the highest degree of care, as a
matter of law, because of the control and direction exercised over the
s See Weisbart v. Berezin, 347 Ill. App. 13, 105 N. E. (2d) 814 (1952), a case
concerned with the right of a natural parent to withdraw a consent to adoption
which had previously been given.
9 A general discussion of the religious element in relation to adoption proceedings
appears In an annotation to be found in 23 A. L. L (2d) 701. See also 54 Col.
14 Rev. 401; 85 B. U. L. Rev. 333.
17 IlL. (2d) 172, 130 N. E. (2d) 172 (1955), affirming 5 Ill. App. (2d) 190, 125

N. B. (2d) 283 (1955).
2 Ml. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75(2).
3 289 Ill. 25, 124 N. E. 334 (1919), wherein the court held plaintiff a passenger
and as a matter of law entitled to the highest degree of care since the necessity for
transferring was a part of his continuous journey.
The court there said that the duty to
4292 Ill 378, 127 N. E. 66 (1920).
exercise the highest degree of care was no longer owed passengers using station
facilities at the beginning or end of the journey or at intermediate points.
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passenger.5 When the passenger, however, has removed himself from the
carrier's control and direction, the carrier no longer has the means to
protect the passenger from injury or itself from liability so the duty is
lessened in a corresponding fashion. If the transferring passenger should
see fit, for whatever reasons, to temporarily place himself outside the
passenger classification, thereby extinguishing the basis behind the imposed
duty, he should not be entitled to the duty imposed by the carrierpassenger relationship. While it is true that the carrier, by his contractual
obligation, may have agreed to convey the passenger to his destination
and to permit a transfer to other vehicles of the carrier as the necessity
demands,6 it should be noted that the suspension of the legally imposed
duty arising from the carrier-passenger relationship does not affect any
of the contractual obligations, so that, when the passenger again presents
himself for carriage, the duty owed to a passenger is resumed. In the
interim, and while on a public street, the erstwhile passenger is no different
than any other pedestrian, hence should be entitled to no more rights and
duties than any other pedestrian. For the law to view pedestrians differently, merely because one of them was in the process of transferring would
serve to create a doubt that justice was being done on an equal basis. The
decision is, therefore, both a logical and a sound one.

DEEDS-CONSTRUCTION

AND

OPERATION-WHETHER

ILLINOIS

STATUTE

RESTRICTING POSSIBILITIES OF REVERTER AND RIGHTS OF ENTRY OR RE-ENTRY
Is CONSTiTuTIoNAL--The decision rendered by the Illinois Supreme Court

in the case of Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v. BatdorfI may
well be said to represent a landmark holding in the Illinois law relating
to real property. In that case, a consolidation of two suits because of the
similarity of the factual situations, certain school districts which anticipated selling property formerly used for school purposes filed suit to quiet
title thereto by having any possibilities of reverter or rights of re-entry
which may have earlier attached to the property 2 declared invalid and
5 Coulter v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 264 Ill. 414, 106 N. E. 258 (1917) ;
Chicago City Railway Company v. Shereve, 226 Iii. 530, 80 N. E. 1049 (1907);
Krueger v. Richerson, 326 Ill. App. 215, 61 N. E. (2d) 339 (1945).
6Van Horrebecke v. Iowa Illinois Gas & Electric Company, 324 Ill. App. 88, 55
N. E. (2d) 652 (1944) ; Spannagle v. Chicago & Aurora Railroad Company, 31 Il.
App. 460 (1889).
16 111. (2d) 486, 130 N. E. (2d) 111 (1955).
2The grant of one parcel, for the purpose of "maintaining thereon a non-sectarian Free school," had been made in 1893. The grant as to the other, for similar
uses, had occurred in 1895. Specific use of these lands for school purposes had
ceased in 1949 when the schools were taken over by a newly organized community
school district. Since then, one of the school buildings had been intermittently
used as a residence; the other had been left vacant. The school trustees took no
action to declare the school sites no longer suitable or necessary but instituted suit
to quiet title in 1951.
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unenforcible by reason of a statute enacted in 1947 and sometimes designated as the Reverter Act. 3 The defendants, heirs of the original grantors
as well as successors in interest,4 objected thereto on the ground the
statute amounted to ex post facto legislation and violatdd the due process
clause of both the state and federal constitutions. 5 The trial court, finding
the statute to be unconstitutional, rendered a decree settling the property
rights in favor of certain of the defendants. The Supreme Court, however,
on direct appeal to it, 6 following a finding that the statute was constitutional, reversed the trial court decision and directed that a decree be
entered consonant with the prayer of the complaints so made. By so
holding, the court has shown a way by which land may be freed from
artificial restraints in the form of mere expectations but which operate as
effective clogs on the passage of title.
One need not look far to discover the doubtful condition of land titles
which have been encumbered by various types of possibilities of reverter
and rights of re-entry capable of running into perpetuity 7 nor be obliged
to search deeply to ascertain the benefits to be obtained through the
adoption of statutes of the type in question s particularly in those instances
where the individual, social or economic reasons for their creation have
long since ceased and where the prospect of securing a release thereof
might be burdened by a virtual impossibility. 9 The difficulty experienced
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 37b et seq. The statute, in general, places
a fifty-year limitation on possibilities of reverter and rights of entry or reentry
created after the effective date of the statute. Section 37f provides for a one-year
limitation on suits based on earlier grants.
4 In one of the cases, certain intervenors claimed the property as owners by
mesne conveyances from the original grantors to the school district. In the other,
the owners of the adjoining parcel from which the school site had been carved
asserted ownership under an earlier partition decree. The Supreme Court refused
to pass upon the question whether their rights were superior to those of the heirs of
the grantors to the schools, being content to note that, while the possibilities of
reverter had not been destroyed by these attempts at alienation, all of the several
claimants were divested of their rights by the holding in the instant case.
5 U. S. Const., Art. I. § 10, and Amendment XIV: Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 2 and
§ 14.
6 Direct appeal to the Supreme Court rested upon Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch.
110, § 75.
7 See, for example, the series of cases beginning with Hackett v. Trustees of
Schools, 398 Ill. 27, 74 N. E. (2d) 869 (1947), noted in 27 CHIcA0O-KENT L&w
REviEw 71, over rights to school lands and school buildings held under varied forms
of limited fee simple estates. In that series, the cases of Brown v. Trustees of
Schools of Township No. 5, 403 Ill. 154, 85 N. E. (2d) 747 (1949), and Low v.
Blakeney, 403 Ill. 156, 85 N. E. (2d) 741 (1949), are but two illustrations.
8An essay by Hammond, entitled "Limitation upon Possibilities of Reverter
and Rights of Entry," contained in Current Trends in State Legislation 1953-1954
(Legislative Research Center, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1954), pp. 589-648, provides an
excellent synopsis on the point.
9 A note in 43 Ill. L. Rev. 90 contains a discussion of the burdens caused by
future interests of the type In question. See also note in 54 Harv. L. Rev. 248.
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in the past led to the formation of the statute here under consideration
but, until the court spoke, there was doubt over the point whether, as
applied to old grants, the statute unconstitutionally deprived persons of
property without due process of law.10 Treating possibilities of reverter
and rights of re-entry as being no more than expectant interests, the
court was able to overcome the due process argument by pointing to the
fact that mere expectations of future rights in property were not to be
considered as vested rights," hence were subject to legislative change,
modification or even abolition. From that point, the court had little difficulty in finding support for Section 5 of the statute,'12 referred to as a
limitation provision, on the ground it rested on the same basis as all other
acts of that character,' 3 prescribing a reasonable time within which to
the obligation of any contract
pursue the remedy and neither impairing
14
nor taking away any vested rights.
While the court has thus done its part to modernize the property law
of the state by declaring the statute constitutional, it could be noted that
the legislature may have made the statute too stringent in some of its
aspects. 15 When fixing a potential duration of fifty years on clogs of this
character, the legislature appears to have overlooked the rapidity of
change likely to be produced in an age of growing industry and of shifting
populations, so it is possible that this fifty-year period may induce more
of the same sorts of hardships as those attributed to the prior lack of any
statute on the subject. There may be reason, therefore, now that the basic
principle has been declared to be a sound one, for some legislative reexamination of the statute in the interest of providing a degree of flexibility in its operation.
ELECTIONS--COUNT

OF VOTES, RETURNS,

AND

CANVAss-WnH

FAILURE TO GIVE ExPREss NOTICE TO ELECTION BOARD OF PROPOSED CONTEST OF ELECTION SERVES TO DEFEAT A TORT ACTION BASED ON DESTRUCTION

OF TiE BALLOTs-A provision of the Illinois Election Code' was con2
strued for the first time in the recent case of Stradford v. Reinecke, a
10 See Denissen, "The Illinois Reverter Act," 36 Ill. B. J. 263 (1949).

11 Jennings v. Capen, 321 Ill. 291, 151 N. E. 900 (1926).
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 37f.
'3 Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 332 (1860).
'4 Smolen v. Industrial Comm., 324 Ill. 32, 154 N. E. 441 (1926).
15 See note in 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 638.
I The case turned on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 46 § 17-20, as It stood prior to
amendment in 1955. It previously provided that, "if any contest of election shall
be pending in which such ballots may be required as evidence, the same shall not
be disposed of or sold until after such contest is finally determined."
26 Ill. App. (2d) 537, 128 N. E. (2d) 588 (1955). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
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civil action for damages. The plaintiff, a defeated candidate for state
office, served timely notice on the Secretary of State and on the opposing
candidates of his intention to conduct an election contest, but neglected
to notify the members of the local election board, the defendants in the
case, of this fact. The board preserved the ballots cast in the previous
general election for the period prescribed by statute, but, upon the
expiration of this period, having no specific notice of any election contest,
the board then destroyed the ballots. As a consequence, it was unable to
comply with an order from a legislative committee directing a recount
of the ballots. The plaintiff thereupon sued the members of the local
board, claiming damages for an alleged breach of duty imposed by the
statute for the supposed benefit of the plaintiff. Judgment was given
against the defendants on a verdict obtained in the trial court, but on
appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District reversed this judgment
when it held that the plaintiff's failure to expressly notify the election
board of the pending contest was a complete defense to any purported
cause of action which arose from the destruction of the ballots.
Acknowledging that the provision of the statute in question served
to impose a duty on an election board to preserve the ballots, the court
was first faced with the problem as to whether or not this duty ran for
the benefit and protection of candidates. This problem was resolved on
the basis of a well-established Illinois rule that a public official is subject
to a civil action for damages, at the suit of a private person, for any
breach of a ministerial duty which proximately causes injury to anyone,
provided such injury differs in kind from that suffered by the general
public.3 The court, nevertheless, recoiled from a harsh and literal interpretation of the statutory provision inasmuch as it omitted any mention
of notice to the board members as a prerequisite qualification on their
duty to preserve. 4 By a judicial interpolation, therefore, the court construed the provision to require the giving of express notice to the election
board of a pending contest before the duty could be said to be an active
one.
It is interesting to observe that, while the case was pending, the provision under consideration was amended in 1951 so as to include a require8 See, for example, Gage v. Springer, 211 Ill. 200, 71 N. U. 860 (1904), in which
it was held that civil liability exists apart from any express civil penalty provided
by statute where the plaintiff can show a duty imposed by ordinance for his benefit
and an injury differing in kind from that suffered by the general public.
4 The court indicated that there were in excess of one hundred candidates for
various offices at the election In question and that contests might be filed in many
other places than before the board. The difficulty involved in keeping track of
the multiple contests which might arise was an obvious one.
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ment of notice.5 The language of the provision as amended does not
stipulate that such notice shall be express, nor does it specify the time or
manner for the giving thereof. In the light of the instant case, however,
it may be inferred that the requirement of notice will be construed so as
to call for actual notice of some sort, hence a disappointed candidate will
need to do more than offer a contest if he desires to have full protection
under the Election Code.

ELECTIONS-VIoLATIONS

OF

ELECTION

LAWS-WHETHER

A

STATUTE

WHICH COMPELs EMPLOYERS TO SUSIDIZE TIME OFF FOR VOTING BY THEIR

EMPLOYEES IS VAID---Social and economic changes occurring during the
last thirty years appear to have prompted the Supreme Court of Illinois
to reconsider the matter of the constitutionality of "pay-while-voting"
legislation, a question which arose in the recent case of Heimgaertner v.
Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Company.' Although a former statute
of this type had been earlier held invalid, 2 the legislature, in 1933, reincorporated the provision at the time it enacted a comprehensive statute
relating to elections.8 In reliance thereon, the plaintiff employees in the
case in question brought suit against their employer to recover a sum of
wages which had been deducted for the period of absence, although such
absence had purportedly been authorized by the statute. From a judgment
of the trial court which was favorable to the plaintiffs, the defendantemployer took an appeal directly to the Supreme Court. 4 The court, abiding by its earlier decision, again concluded that "pay-while-voting"
legislation was unconstitutional in character.
The period intervening between the two Illinois decisions on
while-voting" legislation has witnessed an expansion in the police
exercised by the states to the point where statutes analogous to the
question have been upheld in several states,5 and even the Supreme

"paypower
one in
Court

5 Laws 1951, p. 1486; Ill Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 46, § 17-20. The provision
now reads: ".

..

provided if any contest of election shall be pending at such time

in which such ballots may be required as evidence and such clerk or board as the
case may be has notice thereof, the same shall not be destroyed."
16 Ill. (2d) 152, 128 N. E. (2d) 691 (1955).
2 See People v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 306 Ill. 486, 138
N. E. 155 (1923).
3 Laws 1933, p. 531 S.B. No. 268; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 46, § 17-15.
4 Direct appeal was proper as the constitutionality of a statute was Involved:
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75(1).
5 See, for example, the cases of Ballarini v. Schlage Lock Co., 100 Cal. App. (2d)

859, 226 P. (2d) 771 (1951) ; State v. International Harvester Co., 241 Minn. 367, 63
N. W. (2d) 547 (1954); State v. Day-Brite Lighting, 362 Mo. 294, 240 S. W. (2d)
886 (1952) ; and People v. Ford Motor Co., 271 App. Div. 141, 63 N. Y. S. (2d) 697
(1947).

RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS

of the United States appears to have fallen in line.6 These opinions have
found statutes of this nature to be a valid exercise of state power in the
promotion of the general welfare or justified when compared with minimum wage laws. The principles underlying these decisions have, however,
been denounced as reaching toward a manifestly unjust conclusion, one
which would seriously diminish the protection afforded by due process of
law.' The Illinois court, giving comprehensive attention to these decisions,
has again expressed vehement opposition to any law which would burden
employers with the obligation to provide financial support for the voting
activities of their employees. The court expressed no qualms over the
provision permitting employees to absent themselves from work for this
purpose, but it did give strong regard to the idea that the expense of
supporting public enterprise should not be carried by private interests.8
In reaching this determination, the Illinois court has placed the
emphasis regarding the voting prerogative and the responsibility for its
exercise where the traditions of American culture have placed it, to-wit:
upon the individual. While other jurisdictions may deem social welfare
best served by encouraging political activity through legislative means of
the type noted, it is gratifying to note that the court, by interfering with
the forces nibbling at the sphere of individualism, has made more than a
small contribution to the preservation of political ideals, at the same time
that it maintained a consistency of attitude with respect to the true meaning of due process of law.

INDICTMENT AND INFoRMATIoN-NECESSITY OF INDICTMENT OR PRESENTMENT-WHETHER A DFENDANT IN AN ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
MAY CONsTUTIONALLY WAIvE His RIGHT TO AN INDICTMENT BY A GRAND

Juny-A 1955 amendment to the Criminal Code, one which could well
serve to facilitate certain felony prosecutions,1 was recently tested before
the Supreme Court of Illinois by means of the case entitled People v.

a

In Day-Brite Lighting v. State of Mo., 342 U. S. 421, 72 S. Ct. 405, 96 L. Ed. 469,
the Supreme Court, with one dissent, upheld Mo. Ann. Stat. § 129.060 (Vernon
1949).
T See Justice Jackson's vigorous dissenting opinion in Day-Brite Lighting v.
State of Mo., 342 U. S. 421, 72 S. Ct. 405, 96 L. Ed. 469 (1952). See also 47 Northwestern L. Rev. 252 and 27 Notre Dame Lawyer 456 for critical commentaries on
the Day-Brite decision.
8 In that connection see a comment on the subject appearing in 33 CHIOAao-KENr
LAw REvmw 267.
1 I1 Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 88, § 702, as amended by Laws 1955, p. 238,
states, in part, that:

"...

offenses cognizable in the said courts shall be prose-

cuted by indictment or, except for the crimes of treason, murder or manslaughter,
by information if the defendant, after he has been advised of the nature of the
charge and of his rights, waives in open court prosecution by indictment."
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Bradley.2 The defendant there, held for the felony of assault with intent
to commit armed robbery, 3 filed a written waiver in open court of his
right to prosecution on an indictment returned by a grand jury and, in
lieu thereof, pleaded guilty on an information charging that offense which
was thereafter filed by the prosecuting officer. Subsequent to this plea,
the defendant moved to arrest judgment, challenging the validity of the
statute as amended on the ground that a violation of his constitutional
right to be indicted had occurred.4 This motion was overruled and sentence
followed. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the amendment in
question received an emphatic stamp of constitutionality.
The principal argument offered by the defendant rested on an earlier
New York decision to the effect that, under the then New York constitution, the return of a grand jury indictment was a jurisdictional prerequisite which could no more be waived than could a public trial before a
duly constituted court of law.5 The Illinois court made short work of this
argument by pointing out that, in this state, the legislature had authority
to abolish the grand jury and, as the power to abolish completely included
the power to do something less, a partial abrogation of the privilege of
indictment was open to no constitutional objection, particularly when consented to by the defendant. This result was fortified by earlier holdings
to the effect that other aspects of criminal prosecutions, such as the right
to trial by jury, were personal privileges of the defendant which could be
freely waived. 6
The decision should not prove to be a surprising one in view of the
many cases in other jurisdictions which have upheld similar statutesJ
which statutes have been a by-product of the dispute as to the value of
the grand jury that has raged for more than one hundred years.8 Those
opposed to a continuance of the grand jury system have argued that its
original purpose, to-wit: to interpose a barrier of freemen between the
arbitrary power of the king and the accused, has disappeared with the
2 7 Ill. (2d) 619, 131 N. E. (2d) 538 (1955).
a Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 58.
4 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 8, provides: "No person shall be held to answer for
a criminal offense, unless on indictment of a grand jury, ...
Provided, that the
grand jury may be abolished by law in all cases."
5 People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N. Y. 314, 164 N. E. 111, 61 A. L. R.
793 (1928).
6 Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253, 74 L. Ed. 854 (1930).
See also People v. Spegal, 5 Ill. (2d) 211, 125 N. E. (2d) 468 (1955), noted in
33 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 379.
7 Orfleld, "The Constitutionality of Waiver of Indictment in Federal Criminal
Cases," 21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 76 (1948), at p. 78, provides a list of such cases.
8 An excellent history of this dispute is given in Younger, "The Grand Jury
Under Attack," 46 J. of Crim. Law, Criminology, and Police Science 26-49 and
214-25 (1955).
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rise of free government. In addition, the institution has been said to be
expensive, inefficient, and no more than a rubber stamp in the hands of
prosecuting officials. It has also been charged with turning loose those
who would otherwise be convicted and with being partly responsible for
some of the law's delays.9 By way of response, others have urged that the
history of the grand jury affords many stirring examples in which public
opinion has found speedy expression at times when prosecuting officials
have been unwilling or unable to act. Service on a grand jury has also
been said to provide an outlet for participation in government by laymen,
a practice in keeping with the maintenance of democratic institutions.10
When viewed in the light of this dispute, the Illinois amendment can be
said to possess the virtue of being no more than a conservative reform.
Following upon a degree of experience gained under the operation of the
amended statute, the legislature might well make further use of the discretionary power which has been conferred upon it by the people.
JUDGMENTs-ACTIONS

ON

JUDGMENTS-WHETHER

OF A ScIRE FAcrAS PROCEEDING TO REVIVE JUDGMENT

MERE INSTITUTION
WITHIN SPECIFIED

LIMITATION PERIOD IS ENOUGH TO TOLL OPERATION OF LIMITATION STATUTE

-By its definitive opinion in the case of Smith v. Carlson,' the Supreme
Court of Illinois has provided a technical yet learned interpretation for
Section 25 of the Illinois Limitations Act 2 and the effect it possesses as it
relates to a scire facias proceeding upon a judgment. The record in that
case showed that the judgment creditor, now deceased, had recovered a
judgment in his favor but which judgment had not been satisfied. Five
days before the expiration of the limitation period as to judgments, the
judgment creditor's executors, as the then owners of this judgment, filed
a proper statutory affidavit in the case wherein the judgment had been
rendered, seeking to revive the judgment, and caused a writ of scire facias
to be duly issued. The original writ not having been served within the
time allowed by law for the service of writs, an alias writ was obtained
but this writ, while duly served, was not served on the judgment debtor
until nine days after the limitation period relating to judgments had
expired. The debtor thereafter moved to dismiss the scire facias proceeding on the ground it had been rendered nugatory by reason of the failure
to serve the writ and to secure the entry of the proper order within the
specified limitation period. The trial court sustained this motion and the
9Ports, "Waiver of Indictment in Felony Cases," 3 Southwestern L. J. 437
(1949).
loYounger, op. cit., pp. 218-22 and 224.
18 11. (2d) 74, 132 N. E. (2d) 513 (1956), reversing 6 I1. App. (2d) 271, 127
N. E. (2d) 257 (1955).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 24b.
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Appellate Court for the First District affirmed. Following leave to appeal
to it, the Supreme Court, accepting the claim of the judgment-creditor's
executors that there was no basis for any valid distinction in law between
a scire favias proceeding and an action in debt on a judgment, reached the
conclusion that the commencement of the scire facias proceeding within
an appropriate time was enough to toll the operation of the statute of
limitations, so it reversed the holdings of the inferior courts and remanded
the decision for further proceedings.
Finding no earlier Illinois Supreme Court holding directly in point
or helpful as a guide to the construction of the Illinois statute, the court
referred to textual authority to the effect that, where a statute controls
the time of making or rendering the judgment of revivor, the beginning
of a proceeding of scire facias would be sufficient to toll the limitation
statutes as well as to the Georgia case of Thomas v. Towns.4 In the last
mentioned case, under a statute similar to the one in Illinois,5 the Georgia
court said that in the event a separate suit on a judgment could be
commenced within the statutory period yet not be completed until after
said period had expired, it would be an "unprecedented" construction to
limit the revival of a judgment by the scire facias method to the statutory
time and no longer. As the present Illinois Civil Practice Act makes resort
to a scire facias proceeding unnecessary, the court was able to reach the
conclusion that it was the legislative intent to make a scire facias proceeding and a civil action in debt upon a judgment into concurrent and
identical remedies, hence controlled by equivalent ideas with respect to the
effective operation of the limitation procedure. Such being the case, the
notation on the docket of the institution of the pending proceeding and
the issuance of the scire facias writ was enough to place the action within
the period of limitation.
It might be of interest to note that, at least at common law, substantial differences existed between the two remedies. For example, the old
writ of scire facias to revive a judgment in an in rem action was issued
as a matter of right but the use of the writ with respect to a personal
action was controlled by statutory decree. 7 As it was the purpose of the
writ of scire facias to revive a dormant but existing judgment, s an
3 34 0. J., Judgments, § 1023b, p. 666; 49 C. J. S., Judgments, § 542b, pp. 10002.
4 66 Ga. 78 (1880).
5 Ga. Code Anno. 1935, Tit. 110, § 1002.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 55, states: "Any relief which heretofore
might have been obtained by sore faoCa8 may be had by employing an ordinary
civil action."
7 See Freeman, Judgments, Vol. 1, § 82.
Sin Tucker v. Gramer, 4 Ill. App. (2d) 452, 124 N. E. (2d) 632 (1954), the
court said: "The proceeding by scire facla8 to revive a judgment is not an original
suit but a continuation of the suit in which the judgment was entered." See also
Smith v. Stevens, 133 IlL. 183, 24 N. E. 511 (1890).
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equitable defense would not normally be available unless specific authority
to interpose such a defense had been conferred by statute.9 Furthermore,
at common law, a defense in a scire facias proceeding based upon the
running of the statute of limitations would lie in the event the time
period had elapsed prior to the time the order of revival had been entered. 10
In contrast, a separate common law action of debt upon a judgment could
be instituted shortly before the statutory time had expired and this action
would be considered to be an enforcible one even though the judgment
therein probably would not be entered until after the expiration of the
permitted time, the theory being that such a suit was an entirely new
action. While some courts have placed a scire facias proceeding in the
same category as an action of debt upon the mistaken assumption that
both are new and independent remedies, 1' it remained for the Illinois
court to decide that, despite the actual distinctions still evident in the
two, the applicable limitation doctrines at least were identical and were
cast in a form most advantageous to the judgment creditor.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-PREMISES, AND ENJOYMENT AND USE THEREOF

-WHnumi

PRovIsioN IN LEASE Fop SURRENDER OF PREMISES

IN

GOOD

CONDITION, Loss BY FIRE AND ORDINARY WEaR EXCEPTED, ExoNERATES
LESSEE PROM LIABILITY EoR FIRE Loss CAUSED BY LESSE's NFaLIGENcF--

Having granted leave to appeal in the recent case of (erny-Pickas &
Company v. C. R. Jahn Company,' the Illinois Supreme Court found it
necessary to construe the effect to be given to a provision in a lease of
commercial premises which required the lessee, at the expiration of the
lease, to surrender the premises "in good condition and repair (loss by
fire and ordinary wear excepted)." The leased building had been destroyed by fire, which fire, according to a verdict by a jury, was due to
the lessee's negligence. In a suit by the lessor to recover for the damage
so caused, 2 the trial court gave judgment against the lessee on such verdict,
and this judgment was later affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First
District. On further appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court, being of the
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 333, notes that Judgments based on gambling
transactions, being void, may be set aside or vacated. It could be assumed that
such Judgments would not be revived: Butler v. Nohe, 98 Ill. App. 624 (1901).
10 See Brown v. Chavez, 181 U. S. 68, 21 S. Ct. 514, 45 L. Ed. 752 (1901), and
Freeman, Executions, Vol. 1, § 91, pp. 340-1.
11 Fagan v. Bentley, 32 Ga. 534 (1860) ; Lambson v. Moffatt, 61 Md. 426 (1874).
17 Il.
(2d) 393, 131 N. E. (2d) 100 (1956), reversing 4 IL App. (2d) 164, 123
N. E. (2d) 858 (1954). Kllngbiel, J. wrote a dissenting opinion in which Maxwell,
T. concurred. Earlier aspects of the case may be noted in 347 II. App. 379, 106

N. E. (2d) 828 (1952).
2The action was, in part, prosecuted for the benefit of the lessor's insurer who
had paid on a fire insurance policy and sought subrogation.
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opinion that the provision in question3 relieved the lessee from both
contractual and delectual liability for the damage to the premises, reversed
the judgment and directed that the complaint be dismissed.
In an earlier case, that of Junction Mining Company v. Springfield
Junction Coal Company,4 the Illinois Supreme Court had held that, at
common law and in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary,
a tenant for years would only be bound to treat the premises in such a
manner that no substantial injury should be done through his negligence
or willful misconduct, hence he would not ordinarily be bound to rebuild premises destroyed by fire or otherwise becoming ruinous, nor be
obliged to pay damages for injury which was not the result of the lessee's
own negligence. 5 By inference, however, it would be supposed that, in
the event such a lessee was, in some way at fault, liability would attach
to him unless there was present a clear stipulation to the contrary.
The problem, in the instant case, then, revolved around the purpose,
meaning and function, of the fire clause contained in the lease in question.
Unless this clause served to release the lessee from liability for his own
negligence, it would merely restate the tenant's common law obligation, a
fact seized upon by a majority of the court to justify its reversal, because
of an assumption that modern business men, in the course of their everyday commercial transactions, do not burden their contracts with idle or
meaningless provisions. This assumption was aided, to some degree, by
the fact that the lessor had dictated the terms of the lease so that, if
there was any doubt or uncertainty, the lease provisions had to be construed most strongly against the lessor. 6
While contracts designed to exempt a party from liability for his
own negligence are not generally favored by the law, often being said
to be against public policy and void 7 the contrary view is not new to
Illinois8 or to other jurisdictions.9 Up until now, however, the result has
3The lease also contained provisions to the effect that the lessor should pay

for fire insurance on the premises, with the lessee agreeing to pay for any increase

In premium rates caused by the nature of lessee's business; for an election by
lessor to terminate the lease or rebuild the premises in the event of destruction by
fire; and for lessee's obligation to furnish a public liability insurance policy. It
should also be noted that the lessee convenanted to comply "with all local or general
regulations, laws and ordinances" pertaining to the demised premises.
4 222 111. 600, 78 N. E. 902 (1906).
5 See, in general, Tiffany, Landlord And Tenant, § 111.
6 On that point, see Liberty National Bank of Chicago v. Zimmerman, 333 Ill.
App. 94, 77 N. E. (2d) 49 (1948).
117 C. J. S., Landlord and Tenant, § 262; 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant,
§ 811.
8Jackson v. First National Bank of Lake Forest, 415 Ill. 453, 114 N. E. (2d)
721 (1953) ; Checkly v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 257 Iln. 491, 100 N. E.
942 (1913). But see Kenna v. Calumet, Hammond & Southeastern Railroad Coin-
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been attained on specific stipulations expressly designed to cover the point.
Nevertheless, instances do exist in which similar results have been grounded
on a process of construction. Thus, in the federal case of General Mills v.
Goldman,10 it was held that, on substantially similar lease provisions,
with the lessor, as here, assuming responsibility for procuring insurance
coverage against fire loss, the lessee was not liable to the lessor for damage
even though the fire was caused by the negligence of the lessee.
It has been suggested, in support of such a rationale, that the cost of
fire insurance premiums, under modern leases, will be included in the
rent, hence will ultimately be borne by the tenant, so should entitle him
to the benefit of those fire insurance policies obtained by the lessor."
Where the tenant has, in fact, paid for the coverage, either in full or in
part, no one could quarrel with a result by which the tenant was absolved
from liability.' 2 It is doubtful, however, that such indirect means should
be utilized to support a holding as tenuous as the one achieved in the
instant case.
MUNICIPAL

WHETHER

PROCEEDING

CORPORATIONS -

AMENDATORY

HAS

ZONING

POLICE

POWER

ORDINANCE,

BEEN INSTITUTED,

MAY

AND

ENACTED

BE USED TO

REGULATIONS -

AFTER

JUDICIAL

DETERMINE THE

RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES TO THE Surr-After an application for a building

permit had been denied because the local zoning ordinance purported to
prohibit the intended use of the property, the plaintiff-landowners, in the
case of Ward v. Village of Elmwood Park,' turned to the courts for
relief, seeking a declaratory judgment 2 to the effect that the local zoning
ordinance was void as applied to their property as well as a mandamus
writ to compel approval of their plans and the issuance of a building
permit. The defendant, by way of answer, alleged that the character and
application of the particular ordinance was no longer material as an
pany, 284 Ill. 301, 120 N. E. 259 (1918), where a similar provision in a contract
was held contrary to public policy and void.
9 See Lothrup v. Thayer, 138 Mass. 466, 52 Am. Rep. 286 (1885), for example,
where the court held that, if the landlord wished to protect himself from the
negligence of his tenant, he had to do so by an express covenant to that effect.
10 184 F. (2d) 359, cert. den. 340 U. S. 947, 71 S. Ct. 212, 95 L. Ed. 683 (1951).
11 Brewer, "An Inductive Approach to the Liability of the Tenant for Negligence,"
31 Bost. L. Rev. (1951).
12 See the case of United States Fire Insurance Company v. Phil-Mar Corporation, - Ohio App. -, 131 N. E. (2d) 444 (1956), wherein a like result as that
achieved in the instant case was reached with respect to an almost identical provision except that, in that case, the tenant had paid a share of the premiums for
fire Insurance coverage.
18 111. App. (2d) 37, 130 N. E. (2d) 287 (1955).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 57.1, permits the use of this proceeding
to construe a municipal ordinance.
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amendatory ordinance had been passed after the suit had been filed, which
amendatory ordinance should be considered as controlling. The trial court,
declaring the original ordinance to be void and the later ordinance inapplicable, rendered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiffs
and granted the relief sought. On appeal from this decision to the
Appellate Court for the First District, this holding was reversed, and
the cause remanded for further proceedings, on the ground the later and
superseding ordinance was effective to regulate the use of the property
of the plaintiffs and to control the outcome of the suit in the absence of
any showing of a substantial change in position by the plaintiffs or a
showing that the amendatory ordinance was unreasonable in character.
As a general proposition, it may be stated that a property owner
holds his property subject to the police power of the state, and his rights
of use and enjoyment must yield to the common good.3 However, the right
to restrict such use is not without limitation; ordinarily, it may not be
used so as to prohibit existing uses, 4 and with respect to Illinois municipal
corporations, it is made clear by statute that an existing use may not be
prohibited. 5 While the point at which a non-conforming use is acquired
is sometimes difficult to determine, it seems clear that mere plans or
intentions are not sufficient to give a landowner the benefit of that
exception to zoning regulation." Hence, the plaintiff in the instant case
could not, under traditional concepts, claim to have acquired a nonconforming use.
However, it seems appropriate to consider the fact that, at the outset,
the plaintiffs were prevented from acquiring a non-conforming use by
the wrongful act of the municipality in refusing to issue a building permit.
The effect of referring to the amendatory ordinance to determine the
plaintiffs' right to use their property, as was done in the instant case, is
to lend vitality to that wrongful act. While there is some authority for
taking cognizance of changes in the law during the pendency of pros See Ronda Realty Corp. v. Lawton, 414 Ill. 313, 111 N. E. (2d) 310 (1953);
Dunlap v. City of Woodstock, 405 Ill. 410, 91 N. E. (2d) 434 (1950) ; and People
v. Gill, 389 IM. 394, 59 N. U. (2d) 671 (1945).
4 People v. Morris, 334 Ill. App. 557, 79 N. ID. (2d) 839 (1948) ; and Illinois Life
Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago, 244 Ill. App. 185 (1927).
5111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 73-1.
6 Brett v. Building Comm. of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N. E. 269 (1924) ; City
of Omaha v. Glissman, 151 Neb. 895, 89 N. W. (2d) 828 (1949); see also Deer
Park Civic Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 347 I1. App. 346, 106 N. B. (2d) 823 (1952)
for an indication of the views which the Illinois courts might entertain, though
it was there held that sutfcient steps had been taken to create a non-conforming
UM
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ceedings, 7 it appears to be only an incident to the broader principle that
equity will grant comprehensive relief so as to completely determine the
rights of the parties.' While there may be situations in which recognition
of changes in the law is indispensable to complete relief, it seems doubtful
that this was intended as an independent maxim to be inexorably applied.
This conclusion is bulwarked, at least as viewed in the light of the
circumstances of the subject case, by another well-recognized principle of
both law and equity; namely, that a person should not be permitted to
benefit from his own wrong. Hence, if justice is to be done, it would seem
that the plaintiffs' right to use their property should have been determined
as of the date that suit was commenced.
From a practical standpoint, this decision might be subject to further
criticism because of the dilemma in which the landowner is left where his
property is subject to restriction by a zoning ordinance of questionable
validity. Should he elect to make improvements of a substantial nature
so as to acquire a non-conforming use, he risks having to remove them
if the ordinance is subsequently upheld ;9 should he, on the other hand,
elect to forbear from making such improvements in order to first exercise
his legal right to challenge the validity of the zoning ordinance, his
intended use may be barred by further action of the municipality during
the pendency of his suit, as in the instant case. It seems possible to suggest
that the landowner has been left without a remedy in violation of the
Illinois Constitution.'"
SET-F AN COUNTERCLAIM-SUBJECT M'ER---WH:ER COUNTERcLAix SEExNG TO QUIFT TiTLE MAY BE INTRODUCED IN A FoRCIBLE ENTRY
AND DwAumN
Sui--Concepts relating to the use of equitable defenses
and counterclaims have been expanded by the holding in the recent forcible entry and detainer suit entitled Allensworth v. First Galesburg
National Bank & Trust Company.' The plaintiff there had been a party
7See Baker v. Salzenstein, 314 Ill. 226, 145 N. E. 355 (1924), and Greengard v.
Katz, 270 IM. App. 227 (1933), where the statement is made that courts of equity
will grant relief according to the law and the facts as they exist at the time of the
decree. However, in each of these cases, there had been no Intereving changes in
the law. See also, Superior Oil & Gas Co. v. Mehlin, 25 Okla. 809, 108 P. 545
(1910), and Dieterich v. Fargo, 194 N. Y. 359, 87 N. E. 518 (1909), where resort
was in fact made to intervening changes in the law.
8 Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Allen, 5 Cal. Unrep. Cases 51, 40 P. 752 (1895).
See
also the cases cited in footnote 7 for the context in which the subject statements
were made.
10 nl. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 19.
17 MI1.
App. (2d) 1, 128 N. ]. (2d) 600 (1955).

Leave to appeal has been denied.

9 Gulick v. Hamilton, 287 iM. 367, 122 N. E. 537 (1919) ; Welton v. 40 East Oak
St. Bldg. Corp., 70 F. (2d) a77 (1934).
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to an earlier partition suit, under which the title to the land had been
sold pursuant to the decree and, by various mesne conveyances, had vested
in one of the defendants. Thereafter, plaintiff filed several suits seeking
to relitigate the question of ownership, filing lis pendens notices in connection therewith, but lost in each instance. Plaintiff then began the
instant suit, in forcible entry and detainer, seeking to relitigate the issue
of title and the right to possession of the aforementioned property. The
title holder answered this suit but added a counterclaim seeking to quiet
the title and to restrain the plaintiff from asserting any right, title, or
interest in the said property. A decree was found in favor of the defendant on the counterclaim and, on appeal, the decision of the lower court
was approved by the Appellate Court for the Second District.
It would appear that the defendant could have caused the instant
action to be dismissed as the plaintiff's case did not meet the requirements
of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act 2 but, having been harassed by
prior suits and threatened with the possibility of still others, the defendant seems to have deemed it to be the better policy to find, if possible,
a remedy to the situation by answering the instant action with a counterclaim designed to procure permanent relief. By so doing, defendant
generated the issue of consequence, that is whether affirmative equitable
relief may be granted under the limited forms of the statute regulating
the action of forcible entry and detainer. As the Civil Practice Act does
not generally apply to suits of this character, 3 it follows that the provisions thereof which expressly allow the use of counterclaims, even those
of equitable nature, 4 provide no support for the procedural methods
adopted. 5 This does not mean that counterclaims may not be utilized in
suits of this nature, for the specific statute under consideration does
authorize the use thereof so long as they may be said to be "germane
to the distinctive purpose of the proceeding." 6 The issue, therefore.
became narrowed to the single question as to whether or not the particular
counterclaim was germane in character.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 5 specifies six situations wherein the
remedy is to apply. The sixth one comes closest to filling the instant situation,
as it deals with lands sold under a judgment of a court, but it is directed toward
the judgment debtor who refuses to surrender possession after demand in writing
has been made. The plaintiff in the instant case did not claim pursuant to a
judgment or decree, but more nearly in contradiction to one.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 1, excludes forcible entry and detainer
actions, among other forms of statutory remedies, from the operation of the Civil
Practice Act.
4 Ibid., § 38.
5 The integration provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 11, purporting
to incorporate the Civil Practice Act by reference, are subject to the condition
that this shall not be done where the point is "otherwise provided" for in the
statute regulating the particular remedy.
6 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 5.
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Up to this point, no court had passed on this specific question although
a degree of expansion in the scope of the statutory remedy had been
provided by some earlier cases. Thus, in Melburg v. Dakin.7 it was held
that an equitable defense could be interposed in an action of forcible
entry and detainer although this would, formerly, have been regarded
improper. Similarly, in Bartelstein. v. Goodman,8 it was said that equity
would permit a suit of this nature even though the defendant had an
adequate remedy at law by way of a defense to the action. The instant
counterclaim went one step farther, for it was designed not only to dispose
of the immediate case, but also to quiet the title and prevent further suits.
By providing the liberal interpretation which the court did to the requirement of germaneness, the court has now made the statutory remedy into
an even more flexible instrument for the attainment of justice.
TAXATION-REDEMPTION FROM TAx SALE--WETHER ONE WHO CONTRIBUTES

ENTIRE CORPORATE CAPITAL BUT

OPERATES THROUGH

NOMINEES

MAY ACT TO REDEEMr CORPORATE REALTY FROM TAX FORECLOSURE SALE--

The Supreme Court of Illinois quite recently, in the case of People v.
Hess,' was faced with the necessity of deciding whether or not a person
who contributed the entire capital to a corporation but who operated the
corporate enterprise through nominees was entitled to redeem the corporate
realty following upon its sale under a tax foreclosure proceeding. One
of the several defendants in that case, claiming to be the sole stockholder,
gave uncontroverted testimony that he had contributed all of the capital
to his corporation, but that stock certificates had never been made out nor
issued to him. The corporation later went into bankruptcy, failing to
disclose its ownership of the realty in question. This realty was sold at
a tax foreclosure sale and, thereafter, the sole stockholder exercised a right
of redemption. The trial court, finding that a proper redemption had
occurred, dismissed a petition by the purchaser at the tax foreclosure sale
to have the said redemption declared void. The purchaser then appealed
directly to the Supreme Court on the theory that a freehold was involved, 2
and that court, without the benefit of any prior decision in point, affirmed
the decision when it held that the sole stockholder had an interest in the
land sufficient to support a right of redemption in the corporate realty.
7 337

Ill. App. 204, 85 N. E. (2d) 482 (1949).

See also Coyne v. South Shore

DeLuxe Laundry, 299 Ill. App. 275, 20 N. E. (2d) 117 (1939).
8340 Ill. App. 51, 90 N. E. (2d) 796 (1950).
17 Iii. (2d) 192, 130 N. E. (2d) 280 (1955).
2 While an appeal from a decree establishing a right of redemption would not,
under the holding in Ziegler v. Perbix, 380 Ill. 264, 43 N. E. (2d) 971 (1942), involve a freehold, the court in the instant case, finding that the time to redeem
had expired on the date the decree had been entered, considered the case as being
one sufficiently determinative of freehold rights so as to fall within the provisions
of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75(1).
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It could be said to be well established law that redemption is to be
favored unless injury results to the foreclosure purchaser,3 and that
neither the Illinois Constitution 4 nor the statute relating to tax sales5
requires the presence of a complete legal title as prerequisite to the right
of redemption, the former being satisfied with an undefined interest in the
realty, and the latter failing to clarify or elaborate on this rather vague
requirement. If the stockholder in a defunct corporation could be said to
possess an "interest" in the realty owned by his corporation, 6 it would,
therefore, seem to follow that he should possess a right to redeem from
the sale thereof. While no precise precedent exists with respect to tax
foreclosures, or other involuntary sales of corporate property, a degree
of analogy does exist as, for example, in the case of Bigoness v. Hibbard7
where it was said that an inchoate right of dower in mortgaged realty
would be sufficient to support a right to redeem from a mortgage foreclosure sale. For that matter a color of authority to act for persons
entitled to redeem has been said to be an interest sufficient to establish a
right to exercise the privilege.8 In the light of these holdings, the court
was under some constraint to reach the conclusion it did, to-wit: that a
sole stockholder would have an interest in the corporate realty sufficient
to vest him with a right of redemption.
Whether or not each shareholder, regardless of the size of his holding,
would possess a similar right would call for speculation but, as redemption
is an equitable doctrine intended to produce the broadest of benefits
through the satisfaction of as many debts as possible, 9 it might be said
to extend to every shareholder. Certainly, prior to dissolution, even a
minority shareholder would be entitled, in a proper case, to maintain a
derivative suit to compel the officers of his corporation to exercise the
corporate right of redemption. It would seem to be appropriate, therefore, after dissolution has occurred, to allow such a shareholder to exercise the privilege in the event he believes there is an economic reason
for so doing. 10 That, at least, is what has been done in one case involving
3 Skach v. Sykora, 6 Ill. (2d) 215, 127 N. M. (2d) 453 (1955) ; Hruby v. Steinman,
374 Ila. 465, 30 N. E. (2d) 7 (1940).
4 M1.Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 5.
5Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 734.

6 As the case did not require a determination on the point as to whether or not
the stockholder, on dissolution, acquired legal title to the land, the court properly

refrained from expressing an opinion with regard thereto, being content to recognize
that he had an "interest" but without designating the character thereof. Language
In the case of Mott v. Danville Seminary, 129 Ill. 403 at 410, 21 N. E. 927 at 928
(1889), would seem to indicate that, upon dissolution, the stockholder acquires at
least an equitable estate in the land.
1 267 IIl. 301, 108 N. E. 294 (1915).
8 See Houston v. Buer, 117 II. 324, 7 N. E. 646 (1886).
9 Hruby v. Steinman, 374 Ill. 465, 30 N. E. (2d) 7 (1940).
10 The practical value of such a right would be of doubtful worth in the event

the unsatisfied creditors of the dissolved corporation, as could yet occur in the
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a minority bondholder," so much the same argument should prevail in a
stockholder situation. If this is not to be considered desirable, then the
legislature should modify the statute so as to define the right of redemption more precisely than has been done to date.

Wnis--RuauisrrEs AND VALImITY-WH Tnxa A WILL CONTAINING No
REFERENCE TO CONTEMPLATED MARRIAGE IS REVOKX

BY SUBSEQUENT MAR-

op TEsTATR-It appeared, from the facts in the recent case entitled
In re Day's Estate,' that a testator, contemplating marriage with an
already married woman, made the suggestion that she procure a Nevada
divorce from her acquiescent husband, following which the parties concerned would then intermarry. Prior to the time when the woman in
question departed for Nevada, the testator made a will naming her, by
her then name, as legatee to a substantial share of his estate but made no
mention therein of any engagement between them or any purpose to enter
into a future marriage. Promptly upon procuring her divorce,2 the
parties intermarried and so remained until the testator's death. Upon
proceedings to probate the testator's will, an heir contested on the ground
the will had been automatically revoked by the subsequent marriage. The
county court so held and denied probate of the will. The circuit court,
on appeal and trial de novo, found otherwise and ordered the admission
of the will to probate. On further appeal to it because both freehold and
constitutional questions were involved,3 the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the latter holding when it concluded that, while there was no specific
reference to the forthcoming marriage nor other evidence therein of the
intent of the testator that said marriage should not revoke the will, the
extrinsic facts were sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption as to
4
revocation.
RIAGE

The effect to be given to a subsequent marriage of a testator has
varied from time to time because the statutory law on the subject has
not been constant. In the period between 1939 and 1941, the statute spoke
in mandatory terms, 5 so post-testamentary marriages produced automatic
instant case, might reopen the bankruptcy proceeding because new assets have been
discovered: In re Stein, 111 F. Supp. 327 (1953).
1 Hart v. Brown, 404 Ill. 498, 89 N. E. (2d) 370 (1950).
1 Sub nom. Day v. Day, 7 Ill. (2d) 348, 131 N. E. (2d) 50 (1956).
2 It was argued on appeal that this divorce was void for lack of jurisdiction
but the court, while admitting that the evidence amply supported a belief of an
absence of domicile, held it was obliged to give full faith and credit to the Nevada
decree and to the recitals contained therein as against the collateral attack offered
by a stranger.
8 See 1l. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Oh. 110, § 75.
4 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 197, provides in part that marriage by the testator "shall
be deemed a revocation of any existing will executed by the testator prior to the
date of the marriage."
5 Laws 1939, p. 4; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 197.
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revocation unless the revoked will was revived under a properly executed
codicil signed after the marriage had occurred." By an amendment made
in 1941, the statute was restored to the condition it possessed prior to
1939, so that, now, as then, a post-testamentary marriage will operate
only as a presumptive revocation,7 thereby posing the problem as to
whether the evidence in any given case would be enough to override the
presumption. Heretofore, evidence of an intention to have the will
continue in effect despite the subsequent marriage was considered to be
acceptable only if the will itself spoke on the subject so as to make resort
to parole evidence unnecessary. 8 As a consequence, in at least two instances, 9 evidence extrinsic to the will has been excluded and the presumption of revocation has been allowed to operate.
The court in the instant case returning to first principles, 10 now concludes there is no logical basis for a rule which would permit the use of
intrinsic evidence to prevent revocation but would, at the same time,
exclude the use of extrinsic proof when offered for the same purpose.
Conceding it to be the legislative purpose to prevent artificial or questionable revocations of wills by the introduction of the word "deemed" into
a statute which possessed mandatory effect at least for a while, the court
found it necessary to repudiate certain of its prior holdings if it was to
affirm the decision in the instant case. It was forthright enough to do this
but, of necessity, has now opened the door to the use of parole evidence"
in an area where precision and certainty ought to be present. If the
legislature abides by the decision so pronounced, one more argument has
been added for the eventual and total repudiation of the parole evidence
rule.

12

6 See In re Estate of Kent, 4 Iii. (2d) 81, 122 N. E. (2d) 229 (1954), noted in 33
LAw REvIEw 283 and 1955 Ill. L. Forum 182.
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7 See Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 1, § 1 et seq., which now appears in Ill. Rev. Stat.
1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 197. Compare with Rev. Laws 1872, Ch. 39, § 10.
8 Thus, in Ford v. Greenawalt, 292 Ill. 121, 126 N. E. 555 (1920), the testator
provided for a conditional legacy to a named legatee in case of an intermarriage
which he said, in the will itself, he then contemplated. See also Kuhn v. Bartels,
374 Ill. 231, 29 N. E. (2d) 84 (1940), where the testator referred to "my intended
wife."
9 See Gillman v. Dressier, 300 Ill. 175, 133 N. E. 186 (1921) ; Wood v. Corbin,
296 Ill. 129, 129 N. E. 553 (1920). This principle has also been applied to a will
executed by a non-resident testator insofar as it related to Illinois land: Sternberg
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 394 Ill. 452, 68 N. E. (2d) 892, 169 A. L. R. 545
(1946).
10 See Tyler v. Tyler, 19 Ill. 151 (1857).
11 In order to limit the proof, the court did say the evidence had to be "clear
and convincing." See 7 Ill. (2d) 348 at 357, 131 N. E. (2d) 50 at 55.
12 See the discussion in 33 CHIrAOo-KENT LAW REVIEw 189 as to the holding
in the case of In re Schneider's Estate, 2 Ill. App. (2d) 560, 120 N. E. (2d) 353
(1954), relating to the use of parole evidence to obviate a joint-tenancy arrangement. The holding therein was affirmed in 6 Ill. (2d) 180, 127 N. E. (2d) 445

(1955).

RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS

WORKMEN 'S COMPENSATION-EFFECT OF ACT ON OTHER STATUTORY OR

COMMON-LAW RIGHTS AND DEFENSES - WHETHER AN ILLINOIS EMPLOYER MAY INTERVENE, FOR PURPOSE OF' PROTECTING LIEN FOR COMPENSATION

PAID, IN

His

EMPLOYEE'S

ACTION

AGAINST

THIRD

PERSON

W-O CAUSED EMPLOYEE'S INJURY-The problem as to whether or not an

employer should be allowed to intervene in his employee's suit to recover
for personal injury against a third party tortfeasor for the purpose of
enforcing a right to reimbursement for workmen's compensation allowances paid by the employer was again considered in the recent case of
Sjoberg v. Ryerson & Son.' The employer there concerned had filed a
petition for leave to intervene so as to assert the statutory lien provided
by Section 138.5 of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act 2 but this
petition was denied by the trial court. On appeal from this holding, the
Appellate Court for the First District reversed the lower court determination although it did limit the intervention by saying the petitioner would
have no right to participate in the conduct or trial of the suit unless the
plaintiff-employee consented thereto.
As originally written, the Illinois statute prohibited the injured
employee from maintaining a common law action against any negligent
third person who was also under the act and transferred the cause of
action to the employer who had paid, or had become liable to pay, compensation so as to afford a degree of subrogation.8 In the event the third
person responsible for the injury was not covered by the act, the employee
was free to sue the tortfeasor but the employer was given a lien on any
judgment which might be recovered to the extent that he had paid compensation. 4 Following the declaration in the case of Grasse v. Dealer's
Transport Company5 that the statute was unconstitutional, the section was
rewritten so that it now gives the employee a right of action against a
third person, regardless whether or not he is under the statute, provided
the employee notifies his employer, by personal service or registered mail,
of the fact of suit and files proof of such notice in the action. The employer may then, according to the statute as it now reads, "join in said
18 111. App. (2d)

414, 132 N. E.

(2d)

56 (1956).

2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5, purports to give the employer a lien,
for such sum as the employer is required to pay to the employee under the act,
upon "any award, judgment, or fund out of which the employee might be compensated in any suit or action brought by the employee against a third party
solely responsible for the accident and injury."
3 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 166.
4 Ibid., § 166, sub-paragraphs 3 and 4.
5412 Il. 179, 106 N. E. (2d) 124 (1952) noted in 30 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIEW
375.
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action upon his motion so that all orders of court after hearing and
judgment shall be made for his protection." 6
By way of interpreting the statute as amended, the Appellate Court for
the Second District, in the earlier case of Manion v. Chicago, Rock Island
& Pacific Railroad Company,7 had declared that, if the employer wished
to join in the employee's action, he had to allege that he had in no way
been negligent nor had been a contributing cause of the employee's injury.
The employer in the instant case did so allege, so there would seem to be
no conffict in these two holdings. Nevertheless, the Appellate Court for
the First District, in the prior case of Hyland v. 79 West Monroe Corporation,8 had achieved the conclusion that a trial court had a discretionary
power in the matter, hence could properly deny the employer the right
to intervene in the employee's suit. Actually, in that case, the employer
had not petitioned for leave to intervene but merely sought to assert a
lien in the pending cause against any judgment which might be rendered.
Treating the request as being substantially the equivalent of a petition
to intervene, the court there pointed out that, if the employer was allowed
to enter the case for the purpose of asserting a collateral right, this might
tend to confuse the jury and complicate the issues, hence there could be
a reasonable basis for an exercise of this discretion adverse to the employer's interest.
This possibility of interference with the employee's action appears to
have been considered in the instant case for the court there limited the
intervention by the employer solely for the purpose of protecting the lien.
Evidently, the court concerned with the Hyland case did not consider
,whether a limited intervention was possible, but there would seem to be
no valid reason why one should not be allowed for it would not complicate
the case and would make it possible to give recognition to the express
wording of the statute. There is no doubt that the employer could bring
a separate action for subrogation against the third party if he should wish
to do so. 9 The instant holding, by making it possible to effectuate the
statutory purpose and to save both time and money, is therefore considered
to be the preferred one.

6in. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5(b).
72 IL App. (2d) 191, 119 N. E. (2d) 498 (1954), noted in 33 CmoAo-K=mT L&w
Rmvinw 12.
8 2 Ill. App. (2d) 83, 118 N. E. (2d) 636 (1954).
9 See Geneva Construction Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co., 351 Ill. App.
289, 114 N. E. (2d) 906 (1953).

